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Abstract
Unemployment in the big continental European economies like France and Germany
has been substantially increasing since the mid 1970s. So far it has been di¢ cult
to empirically explain the increase in unemployment in these countries via changes
in supposedly employment unfriendly institutions like the generosity and duration of
unemployment benets. At the same time, there is some evidence produced by Ball
(1996, 1999) saying that tight monetary policy during the disinations of the 1980s
caused a subsequent increase in the NAIRU, and that there is a relationship between
the increase in the NAIRU and the size of the disination during that period across
advanced OECD economies. There is also mounting evidence suggesting a role of the
slowdown in productivity growth, e.g. Nickell et al. (2005), IMF (2003), Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000).
This paper introduces endogenous growth via a capital stock externality into an
otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and unemploy-
ment. We subject the model to a cost push shock lasting for 1 quarter, in order to
mimic a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Mon-
etary policy implements a disination by following a standard interest feedback rule
calibrated to an estimate of a Bundesbank reaction function. About 40 quarters af-
ter the shock has vanished, unemployment is still about 1.7 percentage points above
its steady state, while annual productivity growth has decreased. Over the same
horizon, a higher weight on the output gap increases employment (i.e. reduces the
fall in employment below its steady state). Thus the model generates an increase in
unemployment following a disination without relying on a change to labour market
structure.
We are also able to coarsely reproduce cross country di¤erences in unemployment.
A higher disination generated by a larger cost push shock causes a stronger persistent
increase in unemployment, the correlation noted by Ball. For a given cost push shock,
a policy rule estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) for the Bundesbank
and the Federal Reserve Bank produces a stronger persistent increase in the case
of the Bundesbank than of the Federal Reserve. Testable di¤erences in real wage
rigidity between continental Europe and the United States, namely, as pointed out
by Blanchard and Katz (1999), the presence of the labour share in the wage setting
function for Europe with a negative coe¢ cient but its absence in the U.S. also imply
di¤erent unemployment outcomes following a cost push shock. If real wage growth
does not depend on the labour share, the persistent increase in unemployment is
about one percentage point smaller than when it does. To the extent that the wage
setting structure is determined by labour market rigidities, "Shocks and Institutions"
jointly determine the unemployment outcome, as suggested by Blanchard andWolfers
(2000).
The calibration of unobservable model parameters is guided by a comparison of
second moments of key variables of the model with Western German data. The
endogenous growth model matches the moments better than a model without en-
dogenous growth but otherwise identical features. This is particularly true for the
persistence in employment as measured by rst and higher order autocorrelation co-
e¢ cients.
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1 Introduction
The persistent increase in continental European unemployment since the 1970s is of-
ten blamed on labour markets having become more rigid. There is however growing
evidence that labour market institutions, while powerful at explaining cross country
di¤erences in unemployment at a given point in time, are less so at explaining the
evolution of unemployment across time, or at least leave a lot to be explained. Find-
ings along these lines include the IMF (2003), Nickell (2002), Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000), Fitoussi et al. (2000) and Elmeskov (1998).
This paper contributes to the explanation of the rise in European unemployment
by introducing endogenous growth into a New Keynesian model featuring unemploy-
ment. We implement this in a simple fashion by assuming that technological progress
is realised through investment and thus linking total factor productivity to the cap-
ital stock. We subject the economy to a 1 quarter non-serially correlated cost-push
shock and let the central bank disinate the economy - as happened in many indus-
trialised economies at the beginning of the 1980s. This temporary shock can cause a
persistent and substantial increase in unemployment, lasting over 10 to 20 years in
an order of magnitude of 1 percentage points or more. The model also sheds light on
some cross-country di¤erences in the unemployment experience.
More precisely, we aim to shed light on the following set of stylised facts and
empirical ndings:
 Unemployment has increased substantially in many big European OECD economies
since the 1970s. Figure 1 displays quarterly unemployment rates from 1975 to
2000 for six selected OECD European Economies and the United States. Note
that unemployment is very persistent: It increases relatively quickly, as for
instance during the recessions at the beginning of the 80s, but reverts only rel-
atively slowly, incompletely, or not at all. By contrast, unemployment in the
United States shows less persistence. It also does not show much of a trend.
 There has been a decline in the growth rate of labour productivity (measured as
output per hour worked) across OECD countries in the 1980s. This decline has
been substantially larger in Western European Economies than in the United
States. Average annual productivity growth in Western European economies
was 1.5% lower in the period from 1981 to 1990 than in the previous decade,
while it declined by merely 0.2% in the United States.1 Skoczylas and Tissot
(2005) estimate changes in trend productivity growth for OECD economies from
1960 to 2004. They locate declines between one and 3.9% between 1976 and
1985 in 9 Western European Economies but none in the United States.
1The number is based on cross country averages for 1971-1980 and 1981-1990 of the productivity
growth rates of Belgium, Denmark, Western Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway. These rates are based on the series on GDP at
constant prices and total hours worked from AMECO (2008).
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 It is a consistent nding that a decline in productivity growth increases un-
employment. Examples include Bassanini and Duval (2006), Pissarides and
Vallanti (2005), Nickel (2002, 2005), Ball and Mo¢ tt (2001) and Fitoussi et al.
(2000). Three of these studies (Bassanini and Duval, Blanchard andWolfers, Fi-
toussi et al.) explicitly model interactions between productivity growth declines
and labour market institutions. They nd that macroeconomic shocks help
to explain the evolution of unemployment across time while cross country-
di¤erences in institutions help to explain why in some countries unemployment
responds more strongly to macroeconomic shocks than in others.
 Based on a study of 17 OECD countries, Ball (1999) argues that those central
banks willing to aggressively lower real interest rates during the recessions of the
early 1980s reduced the subsequent increase in the NAIRU in their countries.
 There seems to be a negative medium run relationship between the change in
ination and the change in the NAIRU. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which
plots the change in the NAIRU against the change in CPI Ination for 21 OECD
countries from 1980 to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000. The negative correlation
is not perfect but still obvious: Countries with a larger decrease in ination
su¤ered on average a larger increase in their NAIRU.2 Ball (1996) was the rst
to draw attention to this link and also investigated it more formally.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a model which coarsely
encompasses the mainstream consensus on the long and short run dynamics of unem-
ployment. In this model, a temporary cost push shock only has a short lived e¤ect
on unemployment and so has the monetary policy response to the shock. We coin
this model "Jackman, Layard, Nickell", or JLN economy. We then add the New
Growth extension. Section 3 discusses the calibration, which is informed by empiri-
cal evidence on some of the model parameters and by the comparison of the second
moments of a couple of model variables with their empirical counterparts, which is
conducted in section 4. Section 5 then discusses the response of the economy to a
one quarter cost push shock calibrated to induce a disination of about 4 percentage
points and focuses on the induced evolution of unemployment across time. It also
looks at the tradeo¤s of policymakers face between stabilising ination and stabilising
unemployment. Section 6 adds a cross-country dimension to our analysis. First, we
vary the size of the cost push shock and record the resulting changes in Ination and
the NAIRU over a 10 year horizon. We then compare the di¤erences in the unem-
ployment response generated by a Bundesbank and a Federal Reserve Policy rule as
estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), and nally we investigate the e¤ects
2The data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook. The countries are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, U.S.A.
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di¤erences in real wage rigidity between Europe and the United States. Section 7
concludes.
Figure 1: Unemployment for 6 European Economies and the
United States
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Figure 2: Change in CPI Inflation vs. Change in the NAIRU: 1980-1990, 1990-2000
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2 The Model
In this section we will develop a New Keynesian model with unemployment and
endogenous growth which contributes to explaining the above ndings. To stress the
fact our results stem from the introduction of endogenous growth, we also present an
otherwise identical model without endogenous growth which we take as the starting
point of our analysis. This is a model to approximate the ruling consensus on the
relationship between unemployment and the NAIRU. We will refer to this model as
the JLN economy as the model that develops the current consensus on the short and
long run causes of unemployment. This consensus says that while unemployment
both in the short and in the long run is determined by aggregate demand, only the
NAIRU is consistent with stable ination. Ination targeting central banks will push
unemployment towards this level. The NAIRU itself will be a¤ected by any variable
which directly increases wages in spite of excess supply in the labour market, increases
the pricing power of rms or reduces the e¢ ciency of the labour market to match
jobs to workers (Nickell et al. 2002: 2-3, Jackman et al.1991).
Sections 2.1 to 2.4 develops the JLN economy, while section 2.5 shows which
modications are necessary once we introduce endogenous growth.
2.1 Households
Danthine and Kurmann (2004) introduce unemployment in a general equilibrium
model without moving away from the representative agent framework. In the Danthine-
Kurmann setup individuals are organized in families in a zero-one continuum of fam-
ilies which are innitely lived. All decisions regarding the intertemporal allocation
of consumption and the accumulation of capital are made at the family level. Each
family member supplies one unit of labour in-elastically but derives disutility from
the e¤ort G(et) he or she supplies in their job. The share of unemployed members is
the same for each family. The large family assumption means that although there are
unemployed individuals in the economy, it is not necessary to track the distribution
of wealth.
In addition, some workers supply overhead labour, whose nature will be described
in more detail below. They can be thought of as the owners of the monopolistically
competitive rms. Overhead workers never become unemployed because no rm
can produce without managerial sta¤. A share ns of the workforce is employed by
the government who is assumed to pay the same wage as the private sector. They
are funded by lump sum taxes.3 All families have the same share of managers and
3The reason for introducing both state employees and overhead workers n is to achieve a rea-
sonable calibration of steady state values. In the Romer endogenous growth model, the level of
employment a¤ects the growth rate. This is due to the fact that the marginal product of capital
is an increasing function of employment. The marginal product of capital governs the growth rate
by determining the willingness of households to save. To achieve a reasonable steady state growth
rate, we remove part of the labour force from "productive" sector and thus to reduce the impact
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government employees.
Families solve the following constrained maximisation problem by choosing con-
sumption Ct (which is a CES consumption basket Ct =
hR 1
0
(ct(i))
( 1)
 di
i 
 1
); bond-
holding Bt; investment expenditure It, next periods capital stock Kt+1 and the e¤ort
level et of the typical working family member:
U = Et
( 1X
i=0
i [u(Ct+i   habt+i 1)  (nt+i   n)G(et+i)]
)
; u0 > 0; u00 < 0 (1)
s:t: (nt   n)wt + Bt 1
Pt
(1 + it 1) +zt + rktKt  Ct +
Bt
Pt
+ Tt + It and (2)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It

1  S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

; S (0) = 0; S (0)0 = 0; S (0)
00
> 0
(3)
where Pt denotes the price index of the consumption basket. A familys period
t income consists wages wt, interest income it 1 on risk less bonds they bought in
the previous period Bt 1, the prots of the monopolistically competitive rms in the
economy zt, and dividends rkt from renting out their accumulated capital Kt. They
have to pay lump sum taxes Tt: We assume adjustment costs in investment: Only
a fraction of one unit of investment expenditure is actually turned into additional
capital. This fraction decreases in the investment growth rate. The assumptions on
the rst derivative of the S (:) function imply that adjustment costs vanish when the
economy is growing at its steady state growth rate g.4 This implies that the steady
state growth rate does not depend on the parameters of the adjustment cost function
S: Setting up the lagrangian and denoting the lagrange multipliers of the budget
constraint and the capital accumulation constraint as t and tqt yields the following
rst order conditions with respect to consumption, capital and investment:
of employment on the marginal product of capital by assuming that they perform necessary tasks
without which the productive sector could not operate (managerial work in case of overhead work-
ers, policing etc. in case of the state employees). We assume that government employees are paid
the same wage as private sector employees and are funded by means of lump sum taxes. Overhead
workers will be interpreted as managers who split the prots of the monopolistically competitive
rms.
4There are two advantages of assuming investment adjustment costs and external habit formation.
Firstly, it facilitates matching the second moments of investment and consumption, and secondly,
it makes the on impact response of unemployment to the cost push shock in the simulation we are
going to perform later more reasonable. By contrast, the impact on the longer run response of
unemployment is rather small.
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u0(Ct   habt 1) = Et

u0(Ct+1   habt) 1
1 + t+1

[1 + it] (4)
t = u
0(Ct   habt 1) (5)
Et
 
t+1r
k
t+1 + t+1qt+1 (1  )

= tqt (6)
tqt

1  S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

  It
It 1
S 0

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

(7)
+Et
"
t+1qt+1

It+1
It
2
S 0

It+1
It
  (1 + g)
#
= t (8)
Note that with this notation, qt denotes the present discounted value of the future
prots associated with buying an additional unit of capital today, also known as
Tobins q. We assume logarithmic instantaneous utility. Following Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2005), we assume S

It
It 1
  (1 + g)

= 
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2
: Applying
these functional forms yields the expressions discussed in section 2 of the paper.
The cost of e¤ort function of individual j G(et+i (j)) is of the form
G (et(j)) (9)
=

et(j) 

0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2(nt   n)
+3 logwt + 4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
2
;(10)
log bt = 6 log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns)) + (1  6) logwt 1 + 7 (11)
1; 5 > 0; 1 = 6 = 0; 2; 3; 4 < 0; 1 >  3
where Yt is private sector output. Note that the e¤ort function enters the fami-
liesutility separately which implies that it is independent of the budget constraint.
Furthermore, state employees are assumed not to perform any e¤ort while at work.
The rst order condition with respect to e¤ort is
et(j) = 0 + 1 logwt(j) + 2 (nt   n) + 3 logwt (12)
+4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
The structure of the cost of e¤ort function is motivated by the idea of "gift ex-
change" between the rm and the worker. The workers gift to the employer is e¤ort.
The employer has to show his appreciation for the employeescontribution by paying
an appropriate wage wt(j). A higher contemporary average wage wt reduces e¤ort
because it represents a "reference level" to which the current employerswage o¤er
is compared. Put di¤erently, it requires the rm to pay a higher wage if it wants
to extract the same amount of e¤ort. A higher average past real wage wt 1 boosts
7
the workersaspirations as well.5 The aggregate employment level of non-overhead
workers nt   n summarizes labour market tightness. It is thus positively related to
the workersoutside working opportunities, and thus also tends to reduce e¤ort.
The view that wages have a big e¤ect on workers morale and thus productivity
because they signal to the worker how his contribution to the organizational goals
is valued is supported by an extensive microeconomic survey conducted by Bew-
ley (1989). Bewley found that wage changes (in particular wage cuts) seem to be
especially important. Bewley interviewed over 300 business people, labour leaders
and business consultants in search for an explanation why wages are rarely cut in
recessions.6
The terms bt and (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns)) represent and a modication to the Dan-
thine and Kurman (2004) cost of e¤ort function. bt denotes unemployment income.
This will be chiey unemployment benets and black market income. It tends to
lower the level of e¤ort.7 Workers want to be valued more than someone who receives
benets or does not have a legal job. bt is linked both to past real wages and past
productivity in the private sector, where Yt denotes private sector output. This may
reect both the structure of benets and the manner in which the black market is
linked to the o¢ cial economy. Productivity also has a direct e¤ect on morale and ef-
fort as employees desire their due share of the companiessuccess. Unions might play
a role in this to the extent that they instil a sense of entitlement among employees.
The employer takes this relationship into account when setting the wage, as will
be discussed further below.
2.2 Cost Minimisation and E¢ ciency Wages
The production technology is a Cobb Douglas production function,
Yt(i) = AKt(i)
(TFPtet(i) (nt(i)  n))1 
where the output of rm i Yt(i) depends on the capital stock of rm i Kt(i), the
e¢ ciency of its workers et(i) and the number of non-overhead workers nt(i)   n: In
the Danthine and Kurman model (2004), in a rst stage the rm minimises its cost of
producing a given amount of output. Capital and labour are hired in economy wide
5See Danthine and Kurmann (2004), pp. 111-113. It would be desirable to have the individual
workers past real wage wt (j) in the equation but that would considerably complicate the max-
imisation problem of the representative rm dealt with later, so we follow Danthine and Kurman
in assuming a dependence of e¤ort on the average wage. For the same reason we include average
productivity rather than the respective rms productivity.
6See Bewley (1998), pp. 459-490. A discussion of further evidence is Bewley (2004). Bewley
also argues that his ndings contradicts essentially all theoretical justications of real wage rigidity
not based on gift exchange considerations, like implicit contracts, insider outsider models or the
e¢ ciency wage models based on no-shirking conditions.
7Danthine and Kurman (2007) introduce the benet level as a factor which, ceteris paribus,
reduces e¤ort.
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factor market. However, the rm does not take the real wage as given but sets it
taking into account the relationship between e¤ort and wages given by (12).8 Hence
the rms problem is:
min
Kt(i);nt(i);wt(i);et(i)
rktKt(i)+wt(i)(nt(i) n)s:t:Yt(i) = AKt(i)(TFPtet(i) (nt(i)  n))1 
and et(i) = 0 + 1 logwt(i) + 2 (nt   n) + 3 logwt
+4 logwt 1   5 log bt   8 (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns))
The rst order conditions for capital and labour are
rkt = mct (i)
Yt(i)
Kt(i)
(13)
wt(i) = (1  )mct (i) Yt(i)
nt(i)  n (14)
where mct(i) and rkt refer to real marginal costs of rm i and the capital rental
rate. It will be shown below that even though all rms set the wage individually,
rms will nd it optimal to set the same wage and the same e¢ ciency level. Dividing
the two rst order conditions gives Kt(i)
nt(i) n =

1 
wt
rkt
: Thus the capital labour ratio is
the same across rms. It is then easily shown using the production function that the
same holds for the output-capital ratio and the output-labour ratio. Hence we have
rkt = mct
Yt
Kt
(15)
wt = (1  )mct Yt
nt   ns   n (16)
This then means that the capital to (productive) labour ratio, the output per unit of
productive labour ratio and marginal costs are the same in all rms, as can be easily
veried by dividing the two rst order conditions. This gives the capital to productive
labour ratio as Kt(i)
nt(i) n =

1 
wt
rkt
: Substituting this back into equation (15) yields an
equation formct(i) containing only labour augmenting technological progress and the
factor price, implying that marginal costs are the same across all rms:
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1TFPt)1 
(17)
We now turn to wage setting. The rst order conditions with respect to e¤ort and
the real wage are
8See Danthine and Kurman (2004), pp. 114-115.
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nt(i)  n = t1
wt(i)
(18)
t = (1  )mct
Yt(i)
et(i)
Combining those with the rst order condition with respect to labour yields an
optimal e¤ort level of 1. Substituting this back into the e¤ort function (12), we note
that, as the rms wage depends only on aggregate variables which are the same for
all rms, it must indeed hold that wt(i) = wt . Substituting for log bt and rearranging
then yields
(1 + 3) logwt = (5 (1  6)  4) logwt 1 + 1   0 + 57   2 (nt   n)
  (56 + 8) log

1=

Yt 1
nt 1   n  ns

Subtracting (56 + (1  5)) logwt 1 on both sides and dividing by (1 + 3) then
yields
logwt =
1   0 + 57
1 + 3
  2
1 + 3
(nt   n) + 5 + 8   4
1 + 3
logwt 1 (19)
 (56 + 8)
1 + 3
log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

Hence with the coe¢ cient restrictions imposed above, the wage depends positively
on the past real wage and non managerial employment. It will be above its market
clearing level and thus there is unemployment in the economy.
Note that the last term in brackets is in fact the private sector labour share.
If this were constant in the steady state, as it would be at a constant employment
level, equation (19) could be solved for a long run real wage if 5+8 4
1+3
< 1: As
mentioned above however, in our model, Danthine and Kurmanns, is a growth model.
Therefore the real wage must be growing in the steady state. Thus a wage setting
function simply relating the wage level to employment would not be consistent with
a stable employment level. The easiest way to deal with the issue therefore is to set
5+8 4
1+3
= 1. This does not seem too restrictive: It simply says that an increase in
the log of the time t real wage in the economy (including rm i) has in absolute value
the same net e¤ect on e¤ort (remember we have 1 + 3 > 0) as an increase in the
exogenous reference as represented by logwt 1, log bt and log (Yt 1= (nt 1   n  ns)) :
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Thus we arrive at a real wage Phillips Curve with a labour share term:
logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

;
with a =
0   1 + 57
1 + 3
, b =   2
1 + 3
> 0 and c =  (56 + 8)
1 + 3
< 0 (20)
Equation (20) is a real wage Phillips Curve plus an "error correction term" rep-
resented by the log of the labour share. Note that if there is no e¤ect of productivity
on e¤ort and (8 = 0) and no e¤ect of productivity on benets (6 = 0) we have
c = 0:
It remains to determine the size of the overhead labour force. Following Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999), we assume that in the steady state, all economic prot gener-
ated by employing productive labour and capital goes to the overhead sta¤. Hence
the rm ends up with zero prots.9 This is justied because setting up production is
impossible without overhead labour and the rms prot is thus essentially equal to
the collective marginal product of its overhead sta¤. We assume that the overhead
sta¤ splits this prot equally. We assume the amount of overhead workers required to
enable production is such that the real wage for overhead and non-overhead workers
will be exactly the same in the steady state. These assumptions allow for a straight-
forward way to determine the amount of overhead and non-overhead workers as a
function of total employment. Zero prot requires
  1

Yt   wtn = 0
where  1

is the share of rms prots in output. Substituting wt = (1  ) 1 Ytn ns n
gives, after some manipulation
  1
1   =
n
n  ns   n  s
This is the ratio of overhead labour to productive labour, which we call s: Solving for
n then gives
n =
s
1 + s
(n  ns)
2.3 Price Setting and Nominal Rigidities
Each rm produces one of the variants of the output good in the CES basket. House-
holds spread their expenditures across the di¤erent varieties in the basket in a cost
minimising fashion. Assuming that investment expenditure stretches over these vari-
ants in precisely the same way as consumption demand, we can write the demand
9See Rotemberg and Woodford (2004), pp. 15-16.
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for variant j as yt+i(j) = Yt+i

pt+i(j)
Pt+i
 
. Following Rotemberg (1983) we assume
that the representative rm faces quadratic costs if it alters its individual price in-
ation from a reference level    1. This is the steady state level of ination in the
economy. These cost arise because frequent price changes are bad for the reputation
of the company. Convincing customers to remain with the company nevertheless is
costly. Additional costs arise because deviating from the "standard" level of ination
requires the rm to engage in a costly re-optimisation process. This has to be carried
out by high paid marketing professionals, while price changes close to average ina-
tion can be decided by lower paid "frontline" sta¤. Both kinds of costs are likely to
increase in the rms output as well. We assume the following functional form:
ACt+i(j) =
'
2
(
pt+i(j)
pt+i 1(j)
  )2yt+i(j) (21)
The rm j chooses its price pt+i(j) in order to maximise
1X
i=0
Et

t;t+i

pt+i(j)
Pt+i
yt+i(j) mct+iyt+i(j)  ACt+i(j)

(22)
where t;t+i denotes the discount factor used to discount real prots earned in period
t+i back to period t. Note that because households own the rms, we have t;t+i =
i u
0(Ct+i)
u0(Ct) : Di¤erentiating with respect to pt(j) and noting that, as all rms are the
same, pt(j) = Pt holds ex post, yields
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  

Pt
Pt 1
+ 
'
2
(
Pt
Pt 1
  )2
+Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
  

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (23)
which is a nonlinear version of the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. It is, how-
ever, a consistent feature of empirical estimations of Phillips curves that specications
which include lagged ination as well ("hybrid" Phillips curves") perform better than
purely forward looking Phillips Curves. This is because ination has inertia.10 Back-
ward looking elements are easily introduced into the price setting considerations of
the rm by assuming that the reference level of ination does not remain constant
over time. Instead, we assume that it equals last periods ination, i.e. t =
Pt 1
Pt 2
:
If the ination rate becomes higher for several periods, rms will mandate frontline
sta¤ to handle price increases of that size in order to keep costs low. Customers will
get used to the di¤erent pace of price changes as well, making a higher rate of price
10See for instance Gali and Gertler (2000).
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change less costly for the individual rm. Hence we have
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
+ 
'
2
(
Pt
Pt 1
  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
+Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
  Pt
Pt 1

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (24)
The experiment we want to conduct later is a disination. Ination is brought into
the economy by a so called "cost-push shock" ut widely used in the New Keynesian
literature.11 This shock increases current ination, holding the values of past ination
and marginal costs constant, and is added directly to the Phillips curve equation:
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

(25)
+
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
) + Et

t;t+1'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0
It is easily shown that up to rst order, this Phillips Curve resembles very closely
specications which are obtained by Woodford (2003) under the assumption of Calvo
contracts and full indexation of the prices of those rms which can not re-optimise
prices to past ination.12 It is a forward looking accelerationist Phillips Curve. If
present and future marginal costs are at their steady state level and present and future
values of cost push shock are zero, ination will remain constant. It will accelerate
or decelerate otherwise. Hence the model has a well dened NAIRU.
2.4 Monetary Policy
Monetary Policy is assumed to follow a simple Taylor type nominal interest rate rule.
The exact specication will vary across simulations. However, all specications will
include a lagged dependent variable in order to account for the interest rate inertia
observed in the data. In the baseline, the interest rate reacts to current ination and
the lagged output gap:
it = (1  )

i+  t +
 Y
4
gpt 1

+ it 1 (26)
i;  and gpt denote the long-run real interest rate (recall that ination is zero in the
steady state), the degree of interest rate smoothing and the output gap, respectively.
  and  Y denote the long run coe¢ cients on ination and the output gap. The
central bank responds to the lagged value of the output gap but current values of
11See for instance Clarida et al (1999), pages 1665 and 1667.
12See Woodford (2003), p. 215. In fact, the coe¢ cients on expected future ination and the
coe¢ cient on lagged ination exactly match Woodfordsresults.
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ination. We choose this form because it matches the specication estimated by
Clausen and Meier (2003) on a real time output gap. We will discuss later why this
is more consistent with our model than the alternatives. However, our basic results
are not sensitive to changing the form of the policy rule.
The output gap is the percentage deviation of total output, i.e. private sector plus
the output of government employees, from its natural level. We calculate the output
of government employees by simply adding up their wages, following the convention
of national accounts. We assume that government employees earn the same wage as
in the private sector. For total output, we then have Yt + wtns, while total natural
output is given by Y nt +w
n
t n
s. wnt and Y
n
t denote the wage rate and the private sector
output level consistent with natural employment, or the NAIRU. Thus we have
gpt =
Yt + wtn
s   Y nt   wnt ns
Y nt + w
n
t n
s
(27)
Y nt denotes the private sector output level which would set marginal costs equal to
its long run level  1; given the capital stock and the previous periods real wage. As
can be obtained from equation (25), this would ensure that in the absence of cost push
shocks, ination is neither rising nor falling. The employment level corresponding to
this output level will be referred to as "natural employment" nnt . The natural levels
of output and employment are derived by substituting the equation for the rental on
capital (15) and the wage setting equation (20) into (17) and setting mct =  1: The
natural levels of output, employment and the real wage are then given by the values
of Y nt n
n
t and w
n
t solving
 1 =
(nnt   ns   n)wnt
A (1  ) (1TFPt)1 Kt
logwnt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nnt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

Y nt = AKt
(TFPt1 (n
n
t   ns   n))1  (28)
Note that given the past real wage, the capital stock has a positive e¤ect on
natural employment given the past real wage. This e¤ect works through the negative
e¤ect of a higher capital stock on the capital rental. This tends to lower marginal
costs and thus accommodates a higher real wage given the mark-up. This allows the
employer to meet the demands of wage setters associated with higher employment.
2.5 Introducing Endogenous Growth
The basic idea in the knowledge spill-over model of Romer (1986) is to start o¤with a
standard neoclassical production function with labour augmenting technical progress
as above.13 An additional feature is that labour augmenting technological progress
13The exposition here follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp.212-222.
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might be rm specic. Thus the output of rm i is given by
Yt(i) = F (Kt(i); TFPt (i)nt(i)) (29)
Romer then makes two crucial assumptions:
 Increasing its physical capital simultaneously teaches the rm how to produce
more e¢ ciently. This idea was rst suggested by Arrow (1962). For simplicity,
in the Romer setup, TFPt (i) is simply proportional to the rms capital stock.
 Knowledge is a public good. Hence each rms knowledge is in fact proportional
to the aggregate capital stock rather than to its own.14 However, the impact of
the rms capital stock on the aggregate capital stock is so small that they can
be neglected. Thus the production function of rm i becomes
Yt(i) = F (Kt(i); Ktnt(i)) (30)
This implies that there are now constant returns to capital at the economy wide
level, allowing per capita output to grow. However, there are still decreasing returns
to capital at the rm level. In the Romer model, this leads to a growth rate which is
ine¢ ciently low. This is because saving is to low as the individual return on capital
falls short of the social return on capital.
Thus we set TFPt = Kt in the equations derived in the previous section. The
marginal cost equation (17) and the aggregate production function become
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1Kt)1 
(31)
Yt = AKt(1 (nt   ns   n))1  (32)
To arrive at from the production function (??) ; after setting TFPt = Kt, we divide
by nt(i) n: As the capital labour ratio and the output per unit of productive labour
ratio are the same across all rms, we arrive at (32) :
The capital stock now has a stronger e¤ect on both marginal costs and output than
in the JLN economy. An increase in the capital stock by 1% for a given employment
level (implying that output expands at the same rate) reduces marginal costs by
1%: In the absence of endogenous growth the e¤ect is only % This can be see by
substituting the capital rental out of equations (17) and (31) and then substituting
Yt
Kt
using the respective production functions.
14See Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp.21-22.
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Accordingly, the capital stock also has a greater e¤ect on natural employment and
the NAIRU. The equivalents of equations (28) are
 1 =
(nnt   ns   n)wnt
A (1  ) (1)1 Kt
logwnt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nnt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

Y nt = AKt(1 (n
n
t   ns   n))1  (33)
Clearly, an increase in the capital stock now accommodates a larger increase in
natural employment than in (28) ::
2.6 The Aggregate Equations
This section summarises the models aggregate equations developed above for conve-
nience of the reader and introduces explicit functional forms where that has not yet
been done above. As many of the economys variables are growing in the steady state
(Yt;Ct; It; wt; Kt), simulation of the model requires normalising those variables with
a cointegrated variable. It is very convenient from a technical point of view to nor-
malise with respect to the capital stock. How that is done is shown in the appendix,
as well as the computation of steady state values of the stationarised variables.
Aggregate demand is the sum of consumption, investment, the amount of price
adjustment costs and government expenditure:
ADt = Ct + It +
'
2
(t   t 1)2Yt + wtns (34)
We will assume logarithmic utility so that the consumption Euler equation be-
comes
1= (Ct   habt 1) =  (1 + it)Et

1
(Ct+1   habt) (1 + t+1)

(35)
The level of habit is given by
habt 1 = jCt 1
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Investment expenditures is governed by the following equations:
t =
1
Ct   habt 1 (36)
Et
 
t+1r
k
t+1 + t+1qt+1 (1  )

= tqt (37)
tqt
" 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
  It
It 1


It
It 1
  (1 + g)
#
(38)
+Et
"
t+1qt+1

It+1
It
2


It+1
It
  (1 + g)
#
= t
while capital accumulation is given by
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It
 
1  
2

It
It 1
  (1 + g)
2!
(39)
The capital rental is given in both models by
rkt = mct
Yt
Kt
(40)
However, with endogenous growth, we can write rkt as a function of employment and
marginal costs alone, namely as
rkt = mctA(1 (nt   ns   n))1  (41)
Marginal cost in the JLN economy becomes
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1TFPt)1 
(42)
while in the presence of endogenous growth, we have
mct =
 
rkt

w1 t
A(1  )1 (1Kt)1 
(43)
Wages are set according to equation (20):
logwt   logwt 1 = a+ b  (nt   n) + c log

wt 1 (nt 1   n  ns)
Yt 1

(44)
Total output in the absence of endogenous growth is given by private sector output
Yt plus the output of state employees:
Outputt = AKt
(TFPt1 (nt   n  ns))1  + wtns (45)
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while in the presence of endogenous growth, we have
Outputt = AKt((nt   n  ns)1)1  + wtns
Markets clear:
ADt = Outputt
The evolution of prices is determined by the Phillips Curve, where we replace the
stochastic discount factor by its denition t;t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1 habt)
u0(Ct habt 1) = 
Ct habt 1
Ct+1 habt
(1  ) + mct   '

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

+ 
'
2
(

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

  Pt 1
Pt 2
)2
+Et

Ct   habt 1
Ct+1   habt'
Yt+1
Yt

Pt+1
Pt
 

Pt
Pt 1
  ut

Pt+1
Pt

= 0 (46)
Finally, monetary policy is specied by equation (26)
it = (1  )

i+  t +
 Y
4
gpt 1

+ it 1 (47)
with gpt as dened in (27) with natural output as determined in (28) for the JLN
economy and as determined in (33) for the New Growth economy.
3 Simulation Setup and Calibration
We aim to create a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks in Western Europe
at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the 1980s. That means we would like
to create a situation where annual ination increases several percentage points above
its target level for some time and is then subsequently reduced. Therefore ut is set
equal to 0.03 for the rst quarter and the model is simulated under perfect foresight.
To put it di¤erently, for given values of marginal cost, past and expected ination,
ination in that quarter is increased by three percentage points. In the baseline
simulation, this will give rise to a disination of a bit more than 4.6 percentage
points over 5 years, if we compare annual rates in the rst and the sixth year. This is
at the lower end of disinations actually experienced during that period. For instance,
in Germany, annual ination was at 6.3% in 1981, which was then reduced to -0.1%
in 1986, which is a rather small disination compared to the UK, France or Italy
were ination declined by 8.6, 10.8 and 13.7 percentage points over the same period,
respectively. Note that there is no endogenous persistence in the shock itself beyond
the rst quarter, implying that any persistence in the path of the variables and in
particular unemployment beyond that point is endogenous. The models are solved
employing a second order approximation to the policy function using the approach
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of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). We use the software Dynare to implement the
solution.15
The calibration of the non-monetary policy model parameters for the experiment
described above is presented in table 1. It was arrived at as follows. We distinguish
between four di¤erent types of parameters. The rst set is calibrated according
to standard values in the literature. This set contains the utility discount factor
, the private output elasticity of capital , the elasticity of substitution between
varieties of goods , the depreciation rate ; and the price adjustment cost parameter
'. ' is calibrated as to generate marginal cost coe¢ cient in the linearised version
of equation 12 which would also be generated in a Calvo Phillips Curve with full
backward indexing of unchanged prices and a probability of no re-optimisation is
2/3.
The second set, consisting of ns, a, b and c, is based on empirical evidence. ns
is calculated from data of the German statistical o¢ ce on the number of full time
equivalent employees in the public sector and on total hours worked in the economy
in 2006. b and c are calibrated to be consistent with an estimate of that function.
We estimate (44) on German data on hourly labour costs, unemployment (instead
of employment, as is done in the empirical literature) and the labour share in GDP
ranging from 1970 to 2000. We then calibrate the intercept a to achieve a steady
state unemployment rate of 4%.
The third set consists of the three "free" parameters A,  and j the production
function multiple, the parameter indexing adjustment costs and the degree of habit
formation. They were calibrated to match second moments of a couple of important
variables in German data. The results are discussed in an extended version of this
paper.
Table 1: Calibration of non-policy Parameters
  j A   1 ' a b c  u1 n
0.33 0.99 0.4 0.38 6 0.025 0.452 30 -0.1123 0.08 -0.1 0.65 0.03 0.1793
ns i gTFP u
0.18 0.0181 0.0079 0.003
The baseline calibration of the monetary policy reaction function is taken from
Clausen and Meier (2003), who estimate a Bundesbank policy rule over the period
from 1973 to 1998 for quarterly data. Clausen and Meiers best performing model
yields the statistically signicant coe¢ cients on output, ination and the lagged in-
terest rate reported in table 2 which in fact correspond to the original coe¢ cients
proposed by Taylor (1993) to characterise the policy of the Federal Reserve. Their
estimate of the output gap coe¢ cient is of particular interest because the Bundes-
bank was often perceived as paying less attention to output than the Fed. This is
also borne out by other Taylor-rule estimates, one of which we discuss below. For
the purpose at hand, we consider using the least hawkish baseline coe¢ cients for the
15To be able to solve our two growth models, we normalise with respect to the capital stock and
total factor productivity (see Appendix).
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policy rule in the literature of Bundesbank Taylor rule estimates. It will become clear
why this is the case when we discuss the simulation results.
Table 2: Baseline Calibration of the Policy Rule: Clausen and Meier
(2003)16
   Y 
1.5 0.52 0.75
However, we are also interested in comparing the e¤ects of di¤erent policies esti-
mated for the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. Therefore we would like to draw
on a study using the same methodology to estimate policy rules for di¤erent coun-
tries, Clarida et al. (1998). Their rule is estimated using monthly data. A quarterly
data version of their specication would be
it = (1  )

i+  Et

t+1 + t+2 + t+3 + t+4
4

+
 Y
4
gpt

+ it 1 (48)
Hence the central bank responds to a one year forecast of ination, the current
output gap and the lagged interest rate.17 They measure potential output using a
quadratic trend of a West German industrial production index and their data set
stretches from 1979 to 1993 and estimate the policy rule using the general method
of moments.18 The point estimates are replicated in table 3. Clearly, the small
coe¢ cient on the output gap corresponds more to the conventional wisdom on how
the Bundesbank was conducting policy.
Table 3: Forward looking interest rate Rule: Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1998)19
   Y 
1.31 0.25 0.91
16See Clausen and Meier (2003), p. 22.
17See Clarida et al. (1998), p. 1039 and 1042.
18See Clarida et al. (1999), p. 1040.
19See Clarida et al (1998), p. 1045.
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4 Some Moment Comparison
We now report the results of comparing the second moments generated by stochastic
simulations of the model economy to the corresponding empirical moments for Ger-
man data. The moment comparison forms an important part in the calibration of
the model. The three free parameters ; A and j where calibrated with an eye on
the empirical standard deviation of the investment/capital ratio to the output capital
ratio and the persistence of employment and consumption, both as measured by the
rst to fth order autocorrelation. We report some selected second moments of other
important variables to give an idea how the model in the chosen calibration matches
the data. We carry out the same comparison for the JLN economy, and for both the
baseline policy reaction function and the Clarida, Gali Gertler (1998) estimate.
We consider the following variables: The ratios of (total) output, consumption,
investment and real wages to capital, denoted as Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht respectively (recall
that we have to normalise all the trended variables with the capital stock to render
them stationary) and employment nt (measured as linearly detrended log hours),
the nominal interest rate it, ination t (measured as the change in the consumer
price index (CPI)), productivity growth pt (measured as change in real GDP per
hour worked), capital stock growth gt, and the investment/ savings rate I=Y: From
those, we compute the following moments: The coe¢ cient of variation for output,
the relative standard deviations of Dt, Rt and t to Ft, the standard deviations of
employment, the savings rate and capital stock growth , the cross-correlation of all
variables with Ft and the autocorrelation of each variable up to the fth order. We
conduct the moment comparison for both the baseline case and the reaction function
estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler.
The construction of the data for Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht are discussed in the Appendix.
The raw data was obtained from the Statistische Bundesamt, except for the nominal
interest rate and the ination data which was obtained from the "International Fi-
nancial Statistics" CD-ROM. The data set ranges 1970:Q1 to only 1990:Q4 because
reunication is associated with a big drop in Ft; Dt and Rt; which would distort the
moments. Furthermore, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that all vari-
ables other than employment, ination and the nominal interest rate are stationary.
This is why we do not detrend or lter them. However we adjust the sample to induce
stationarity if stationarity is not conrmed for the full sample by either an ADF test
(by rejecting the null of a unit root) or a KPSS test (by not rejecting the null of
stationarity). Where we have to detrend, we use a linear time trend. The details are
given in the appendix.
Table 4 reports the various standard deviations, relative standard deviations and
cross-correlations with the output capital ratio Ft listed above. Column 1 contains the
data, while column 2 and 3 refer to the baseline policy reaction function. The standard
deviation of employment for the New Growth economy is on the mark because we have
calibrated the standard deviation of the cost push shock accordingly. The resulting
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coe¢ cient of variation of Ft for the New Growth Model (NGM) is smaller than in the
data. It is in fact almost equal to the standard deviation of employment, which is in
fact also true for the JLN economy. The relative standard deviation of Dt in the New
Growth model is very close to the data, while in the JLN economy, it is far too low.
The relative standard deviation of Rt with respect to Ft is close to the data in both
models but closer in the New Growth economy. The standard deviations of capital
stock growth is very close to the data in the New Growth economy. The same holds
for the standard deviation of capital stock growth relative to the standard deviation
of employment (0.0766 as opposed to 0.0714 in the data). This is important because
movements capital stock growth rates drive the results (and in particular employment)
in the New Growth economy discussed in the next section. Therefore we would like
the standard deviation of capital stock growth relative to employment to be close to
the data. In the JLN economy, this relative standard deviation is too high.
Turning to the cross-correlations, what is most striking is that for the JLN
economy, corr(it; Ft); corr(t; Ft); corr(pt; Ft) are wrongly signed. They are nega-
tive where the data is positive. The New Growth model produces wrong signs for
corr(t; Ft); though the absolute value is much smaller than for the JLN Economy,
and corr(Ht; Ft): The magnitudes of corr(Dt; Ft) and corr(Rt; Ft) are not too far
away from the data for both models, while for corr(nt; Ft); both models produce con-
siderably too high values. It is particularly interesting that the New Growth model
produces a positive correlation between the output capital ratio and the nominal
interest rate. Correctly matching the correlation of output with ination and the
nominal interest rate is generally perceived as a di¢ culty in New Keynesian models
if demand shocks are absent.20
Table 4: Relative Standard Deviations and Cross-Correlations
Moments Data JLN NGM CGG: JLN CGG: NGM
sd:Ft=meanFt 0.0272 0.0115 0.0192 0.0077 0.0215
sd:Dt=sd:Ft 0.6179 0.4447 0.5936 0.4619 0.5910
sd:Rt=sd:Ft 0.4888 0.5783 0.4540 0.6072 0.4812
sd:nt 0.0196 0.0112 0.0209 0.0074 0.0235
sd: (It=Yt) 0.0092 0.0048 0.0053 0.0035 0.0061
sd:t= (sd:Ft=meanFt) 0.208 0.3645 0.2001 0.8801 0.1982
sd:gt 0.0014 0.0012 0.0016 0.0009 0.0018
corr(Dt; Ft) 0.8658 0.95 0.9923 0.8863 0.9906
corr(Rt; Ft) 0.9102 0.9317 0.9953 0.8898 0.9948
corr(nt; Ft) 0.5921 0.950 0.9990 0.8001 0.9991
corr(it; Ft) 0.1557 -0.6772 0.0830 0.0188 0.8804
corr(t; Ft) 0.2001 -0.5071 -0.0901 0.1471 0.2263
corr(pt; Ft) 0.2653 -0.1966 0.7587 -0.2452 0.8262
corr(Ht; Ft) 0.4924 0.4476 -0.6729 0.4468 -0.7258
20See for instance Nolan and Thoenissen (2005), p. 25-26.
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Table 5 reports the autocorrelation up to the fth order for the data and the
baseline case. For those variables which we do not reject the null of stationarity over
the full sample we use the dataset starting in 1970 rather than the reduced dataset
starting in 1974 in order not to unnecessarily sacrice information. When the i-th
order autocorrelation of a variable is within 0:1 of the corresponding autocorrelation
in the sample, it is printed in bold. A number in italics means that the value is closer
to the data than the i-th order autocorrelation of the same variable in the competing
model. Concerning the variables Ft; Dt;and nt; we observe that the New Growth
economy is matching the persistence the data quite closely. By contrast, Rt; gt, it
and It=Yt are considerably less persistent in the New Growth model than in the data,
although they are still considerably closer to the data than in the JLN economy
Conversely, all these variables show far too little persistence in the JLN economy
(and for all variables less than in the New Growth economy): The autocorrelations
are dying o¤ too quickly.
For t; both models produce very similar autocorrelations. They match the rst
order autocorrelation but all the remaining ones are incorrectly signed. For pt; both
models produce incorrectly signed rst and second order autocorrelations. The JLN
economy then does match the sign of the third order autocorrelation but produces
wrong signs for the remainder. The New Growth economy produces a wrong sign
for the third order autocorrelation but almost matches the fourth and matches the
sign of the fth. For the real wage to capital ratio Ht; both models match the rst
to fourth order autocorrelation, though the JLN economy comes closer to the data.
The New Growth economy fails match the fth order autocorrelation, while the JLN
economy does.
Thus the New Growth model does mostly better than the neoclassical at matching
the datas second moments for the baseline central bank reaction function, with very
few exceptions.
Table 5: Autocorrelations, Baseline
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Order of Autocorrelation Data JLN NGM Data JLN NGM
Ft Ft Ft it it it
1 0.86 0.89 0.93 0.9 0.8 0.84
2 0.75 0.65 0.82 0.75 0.49 0.58
3 0.65 0.4 0.71 0.58 0.22 0.38
4 0.56 0.22 0.63 0.39 0.06 0.25
5 0.47 0.08 0.58 0.23 -0.00 0.2
Dt Dt Dt t t t
1 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.35 0.45 0.42
2 0.9 0.65 0.85 -0.16 0.1 0.07
3 0.85 0.4 0.76 0.21 -0.07 -0.09
4 0.79 0.22 0.71 0.6 -0.11 -0.11
5 0.73 0.11 0.68 0.17 -0.08 -0.07
Rt Rt Rt pt pt pt
1 0.96 0.9 0.94 -0.03 0.53 0.84
2 0.92 0.68 0.82 -0.18 0.07 0.67
3 0.86 0.45 0.7 -0.02 -0.21 0.53
4 0.81 0.24 0.6 0.37 -0.31 0.47
5 0.74 0.1 0.54 0.04 -0.27 0.42
nt nt nt Ht Ht Ht
1 0.93 0.88 0.94 0.92 0.99 0.99
2 0.84 0.65 0.84 0.89 0.95 0.97
3 0.73 0.34 0.74 0.85 0.9 0.94
4 0.62 0.20 0.66 0.82 0.84 0.92
5 0.51 0.08 0.62 0.78 0.78 0.89
Order of Autocorrelation Data NCM NG Data NCM NG
g g g I=Y I=Y I=Y
1 0.97 0.9 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.94
2 0.94 0.68 0.82 0.91 0.71 0.82
3 0.89 0.45 0.7 0.87 0.49 0.69
4 0.85 0.24 0.6 0.82 0.3 0.58
5 0.79 0.1 0.54 0.75 0.15 0.51
We now turn to the reaction function estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1998). The relative standard deviations and cross correlations can be obtained from
columns 4 and 5 of table 4. Again the standard deviations of Ft and nt are quite close
to each other for both models, unlike in the data. The New Growth economy still
closely matches the relative standard deviation of Dt and Rt (the later even better
than before). In the JLN economy the relative standard deviation of Dt is still a
good deal too low and the relative standard deviation of Rt is even further from the
data than before. corr(Dt; Ft) and corr(Rt; Ft) are almost equal while corr(nt; Ft)
is considerably reduced (and thus brought closer to the data) for the JLN economy.
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corr(Ht; Ft) and corr(pt; Ft) also show some change in magnitude but not in signs. By
contrast, corr(t; Ft) becomes positive in both models, with the New Growth model
coming very close to the data. Concerning the autocorrelations, which are reported
in Table 6, note that they generally increase somewhat in the New Growth model,
much so in case of it; but decrease in the neoclassical model, with the exception of it
and t: Thus we conclude that the New Growth model is still better at matching the
second moments discussed here, in particularly the persistence in the data, than the
JLN economy.
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Table 6: Autocorrelations, Clarida, Gali Gertler Reaction Function
Order of Autocorrelation Data JLN NGM Data JLN NGM
Ft Ft Ft it it it
1 0.86 0.84 0.96 0.9 0.91 0.99
2 0.75 0.57 0.87 0.75 0.73 0.98
3 0.65 0.30 0.77 0.58 0.55 0.96
4 0.56 0.10 0.69 0.39 0.42 0.93
5 0.47 -0.01 0.64 0.23 0.34 0.91
Dt Dt Dt t t t
1 0.93 0.77 0.96 0.35 0.66 0.49
2 0.9 0.46 0.90 -0.16 0.36 0.14
3 0.85 0.23 0.83 0.21 0.12 -0.06
4 0.79 0.13 0.78 0.6 -0.03 -0.13
5 0.73 0.12 0.74 0.17 -0.1 -0.11
Rt Rt Rt pt pt pt
1 0.96 0.92 0.96 -0.03 0.34 0.9
2 0.92 0.72 0.86 -0.18 -0.00 0.76
3 0.86 0.48 0.75 -0.02 -0.20 0.64
4 0.81 0.26 0.65 0.37 -0.26 0.55
5 0.74 0.08 0.58 0.04 -0.23 0.49
nt nt nt Ht Ht Ht
1 0.93 0.82 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.99
2 0.84 0.53 0.88 0.89 0.95 0.98
3 0.73 0.24 0.8 0.85 0.91 0.95
4 0.62 0.03 0.73 0.82 0.85 0.93
5 0.51 -0.1 0.68 0.78 0.8 0.90
Order of Autocorrelation Data NCM NG Data NCM NG
g g g I=Y I=Y I=Y
1 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95
2 0.92 0.72 0.86 0.91 0.78 0.85
3 0.88 0.48 0.75 0.87 0.58 0.73
4 0.83 0.26 0.65 0.82 0.37 0.62
5 0.78 0.08 0.58 0.75 0.19 0.54
5 Simulation Results
Figure 3 plots the response of actual unemployment for the JLN and the New Growth
economy to the one quarter cost push shock. In all gures, the initial value is the
steady state value of the respective variable. Furthermore, when we refer to Base-
linein gures or in the text, we always mean the New Growth economy in its
baseline calibration.
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In the JLN economy, unemployment increases by about 3 percentage points on
impact but starts recovering after reaching a maximum of 10.4%. It then quickly
recovers and in quarter 8 practically returns to its steady state value and then slightly
overshoots for some time. Employment would be expected to decrease because the
cost push shock will increase ination which will ultimately lead to an increase in
ex ante real interest rates via equation 13. As consumers and investors are forward
looking, this causes a contraction of aggregate demand on impact. Figure 4 plots the
ination rate, which peaks in quarter 1 at a value of about 3.8% and then quickly
declines back to zero.
Figure 3: Unemployment in the New Growth and the JLN
Economy
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Figure 4: Inflation in the New Growth and the JLN Economy
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Figure 5: Baseline - Unemployment and NAIRU
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By contrast, in the New Growth economy, unemployment increases by more on
impact than in the JLN economy. Even more important, the increase is far more
persistent. After about 11 quarters (10 quarters after the end of the shock), when
employment is already overshooting in the JLN economy, only a bit more than half
of the on-impact loss in employment has vanished and employment is still about 3.2
percentage points below its steady state value. What is more, employment growth
then comes to a halt: quarterly increases are around 0.06 percentage points per
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quarter or less. As can be seen in table 4, in the New Growth economy, after 10
years unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state value
and after 15 years the di¤erence is still about 1.2 percentage points. Thus as often
observed in the Europe, unemployment increases quickly but falls only very slowly.
Furthermore, Figure 5 reveals that the persistent increase in actual unemployment is
matched by an increase in the NAIRU, as after six quarters, actual unemployment
falls below the NAIRU, which gradually increases during and after the recession. A
glance at Figure 4 shows that ination (after peaking in quarter 1 at a quarterly rate
of about 3.3 percentage point) indeed stops declining at about the same time actual
unemployment falls below the NAIRU, as we would expect from the denition of the
NAIRU.
Table 4: Unemployment deviation from the Steady State in the New
Growth Economy, Baseline and  y= 5
Quarters 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Baseline 3.1 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.2 1 0.8
 Y = 5 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4
We know from (44) that an increase in unemployment will reduce real wage growth
which would tend to lower marginal costs, so there must be a strong countervailing
force pushing marginal costs up in order to explain why ination stops falling. Figure
6 shows that while real wage growth drops sharply, in quarter 2 the growth rate of
the capital stock falls by even more and remains considerably below real wage growth
for about 9 quarters. After that they are about equal. Slower capital stock growth
entails slower technological progress and thus slower growth of labour productivity,
which will tend to generate a higher trajectory of marginal cost for a given level of
real wage growth. In the New Growth model, the movement of real wages relative to
labour productivity for a given employment level is thus captured by the evolution
of the wage capital ratio. This variable matters a lot for marginal cost, as shown
by (43). Figure 7, which plots the deviations of marginal cost and the wage capital
ratio from their steady state values conrms that it is the movement of the real wage
capital ratio which drives marginal cost back up, as both move broadly in parallel.
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Figure 6: Baseline - Capital Stock Growth and Real Wage
Growth
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Figure 7: Baseline - Real Wage Capital Ratio and Marginal
Costs
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By contrast, in the JLN economy, the e¤ect of the capital stock on marginal
costs is much weaker. The major determinant of marginal costs apart from real
wages is total factor productivity TFPt. This grows exogenously no matter whether
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output and investment are contracting or growing. Thus marginal costs or, to put it
di¤erently, the permissible, non-inationary rate of real wage growth are much less
a¤ected by changes to the capital stock.
Turning back to the New Growth economy, the recovery of actual employment
has to slow down after about 6 quarters because unemployment arrives at a level
beyond which any reduction would cause ination to accelerate as it pushes real wage
growth above the growth rate of the capital stock and thus pushes up marginal cost.
This would trigger interest rate increases via the policy rule. In fact this is already
happening as actual unemployment is falling below the NAIRU and ination starts
to pick up. To put it di¤erently, the central bank does not have a reason to boost
employment by aggressively lowering the interest rate because although ination is
somewhat below target, the output gap is closed as marginal cost equals its steady
state value. Figure 8 shows that the central bank stops lowering the real interest rate
it   Ett after 8 quarters, when it is 0.45 percentage points (about 1.81 percentage
points at an annualised rate) below the steady state value, and begins to tighten
again.
This level of the real interest rate is not very expansionary, while below its steady
state value, is not very expansionary. Figure 9 summarises the benets from investing
by plotting the present discounted value of an additional unit of capital, qt. qt recovers
quickly after the shock has passed and reaches its steady state value of one after ve
quarters. It then slightly exceeds its steady state level for six quarters. However,
this is not su¢ ciently high to move the capital stock growth rate up quickly because
of the investment adjustment costs: The rst order condition (??) determines the
investment growth rate, which due to fast recovery of qt; moves much closer to its
steady state value as well. However, the capital stock growth rate depends on the
investment capital ratio, as can be seen from equation (39), which has declined during
the recession and subsequent period of slow growth. Thus a faster recovery of capital
stock growth would require an investment growth rate exceeding the steady state,
which would have to be induced by an above steady state qt which in turn would
require a lower real interest rate.
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Figure 8: Baseline - Real Interest Rate
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Figure 9: Baseline - Tobin's q
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.01
1.02
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Quarters
Baseline - Tobin's q
The speed of recovery is then governed by the relative growth rates of real wages
and the capital stock. From quarter 9 onwards, the capital stock grows slightly faster
than real wages. This causes a slow decline in the wage-capital ratio, as can be
obtained from gure 8, and allows for a slow reduction in unemployment because
32
higher productivity growth implies rms can accommodate the increased real wage
growth associated with a tighter labour market without facing an increase in marginal
costs. This, in turn, again increases capital stock growth by increasing the marginal
product of capital.
Thus the disination engineered by the central bank, while clearly successful, has
come at a cost beyond a temporary reduction in employment: The unemployment
level consistent with constant ination, has increased. Just as found by Ball, a
successful disination during which the economy goes into a recession is followed by
an increase in the NAIRU.
Associated with the increase in unemployment is a persistent slowdown in labour
productivity growth. This is in line with the evidence cited above. It is easily shown
that labour productivity growth across all employees in the New Growth model can
be written as pt =
Outputt
Outputt 1
nt 1
nt
  1. Thus if quarterly employment changes are
negligible, productivity growth equals output growth. Furthermore, with employment
approximately constant, output growth is essentially equal to capital stock growth.
Therefore, from quarter 9 onwards, pt approximately equals capitals stock growth.
At this point it falls short of its steady state value by about 0.23% per quarter or
0.92% at an annualised rate, while 40 quarters after the shock it is still about 0.11%
lower than in the steady state, or 0.44% at an annualised rate. Average annualised
productivity growth over the rst 10 years after the shock equals 2.46%. Assuming
that average productivity growth before the shock hit equalled its steady state rate
of 3.42%, this implies a decline of average productivity growth from one decade to
the next of 0.96%. Interestingly, average German productivity growth did decline by
1.44% from the 1970s to the 1980s.21
These results provoke the question how changes to the central banks reaction
function would a¤ect the long-run paths of employment and ination. Intuition would
expect that a stronger weight on the output gap in the reaction function would lead
to a smaller decrease in employment not just in the short but also in the long run. As
investment would be squeezed less, there would be a smaller decline in capital stock
growth which could accommodate higher of non-inationary employment after the
recovery from the recession. To show this we increase the coe¢ cient on the output
gap,  y, to 5, leaving all other parameters the same. The corresponding evolution
of unemployment can be obtained from gure 10. Indeed unemployment not only
increases considerably less in the short run (in fact it decreases on impact), and after
40 quarters, it is still about 0.8 percentage point lower than in the Baseline case,
as can be obtained from the second line of table 7. Hence a less hawkish monetary
policy has indeed very long-lasting benign e¤ects on unemployment.
21Productivity is measured as real GDP per hour worked. The data was taken from Statistisches
Bundesamt Wiesbaden (2007b). A sophisticated analyses of changes in trend productivity growth
by Skoczylas and Tissot (2005) nds a negative break for Germany in 1979 of -2.75%
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Figure 10: Unemployment in the Baseline and with a high Output
Gap Coefficient
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Figure 11: Output Gap Weight=5: Inflation
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The lower increase in unemployment comes at the cost of a considerably stronger
short run ination surge. While in the baseline simulation, ination peaks a (quar-
terly) rate of 3.3%, it now increases as high as 4.9% in the rst quarter, as can be
obtained from gure 11, while the annual ination rate over the rst year amounts to
15%. Note however that the increase in ination is only temporary. After 10 quarters,
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it has already decreased to 0.42%. Thus the stronger acceleration in ination is a
short run phenomenon. The gain in employment is of more persistent nature.
As mentioned above, Ball (1999) nds that during the recessions of the early 1980s,
countries whose central banks aggressively lowered interest rates experienced smaller
increases in the NAIRU than those which did not. Ball calculates the di¤erence
between the NAIRU in the year before the recession and ve years after. He denes a
recession as one year with GDP growth below 1%. He regresses this on the maximum
reduction of the ex-post real interest rate during any time of the recessions rst year,
which he refers to as maximum easing.22 The coe¢ cient on maximum easing is -0.42
and is signicant at the 10% level.23 We try to replicate this relationship with our
New Growth model by varying the output gap coe¢ cient between 0 and 4, leaving
everything else the same, thus obtaining data on maximum easing and the ve year
change in the NAIRU. Our resulting coe¢ cient on maximum easing is negative as
well and varies between -0.24 and -1.16. This is for the most part consistent with
Balls estimate.
6 Cross Country Aspects
The previous section shows that our New Keynesian model with endogenous growth
is able to produce a persistent increase in unemployment as a consequence of a dis-
ination. This is an important result because economists have been struggling to
explain the evolution of unemployment in continental Europe over time. This begs
the question whether we can also use the model to replicate di¤erences in unemploy-
ment evolutions across countries. We address this issue in three di¤erent ways in this
section. For that purpose, we will draw on the di¤erences in the size of the disination
across the OECD, in (estimates of) the policy reaction function coe¢ cients between
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve and in real wage rigidity.
We noted earlier that there is a negative correlation between the change in ina-
tion and the change in the NAIRU. Ball (1996) investigated this for the 1980s and
we plotted it over two decades and across 21 OECD countries in gure 2. There
are various possible reasons why countries might have di¤erently sized disinations.
Economies might di¤er in the way they respond to global supply shocks, perhaps
due to di¤erences in energy intensity of production. Their past record of monetary
policy might di¤er as well, (in the sense that some central banks have let ination
spiral more out of bounds than others, leading to larger deviations of ination from
target), as might choices of how much to disinate (a central bank might just be
willing to accept a higher ination rate following a supply shock). Finally, exchange
rate volatility might di¤er as well. Incorporating these various sources of ination
volatility into our model would be far beyond the scope of this paper. However, we
22Ball controls for the duration of unemployment benets.
23See Ball (1999), p. 207.
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do try to mimic their inationary impact by varying the size of the cost push shock.
We vary the size of the cost push shock from 0.01 to 0.05, leaving all other pa-
rameters unchanged. Then we calculate the change from year 1 to year 10 of the
ination rate during those years and the NAIRU in the rst quarter of those years,
and plot the later against the former in gure 12.24 There is a clear negative corre-
lation. The slope of the line varies between -0.41 and -0.56, which not too far away
from the simple regression coe¢ cient of -0.33 (or -0.36 if, like Ball (1996) we exclude
Greece) resulting from a regression of the change in the NAIRU on the change in
ination using the OECD data presented earlier.
Figure 12: Change in Inflation vs. Change in the NAIRU over 10
Years
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Let us now take a look at the e¤ect of observable di¤erences in the monetary policy
rule. To get a proper idea of the e¤ects of these it is obviously important to have
comparable estimates. Therefore we make use of the fact that Clarida et al. (1998)
estimated the same policy rule using the same methodology for several countries,
including Germany and the United States. We would have liked to draw on real time
estimates as in the previous section but to our knowledge, internationally comparable
estimates of this kind do not exist. The coe¢ cient estimates of Clarida et al. of (48)
for the Federal Reserve are reproduced in table 3.
We now repeat the same experiment we conducted in the last section for both the
estimates for the Bundesbank reaction function and the coe¢ cients of the Federal
24We take the di¤erence of the rst quarter of both years since the NAIRU moves up very fast
during the rst four quarters. Di¤erencing the annual averages of the two years would create a
misleading impression of the correlation between the medium run change in the NAIRU (by unduly
reducing this change) and the change in ination. The quarterly movements of the NAIRU in the
OECD data are very slow and redoing gure one with the di¤erence in the NAIRU between 1980
quarter1 1990 quarter 1 rather than with the di¤erences in the annual averages as is the case now
would not change the result.
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Reserve. The rst two lines of Table 8 show the deviation of unemployment from
is steady state for both set of coe¢ cients. Note rst that the persistent increase in
unemployment with the policy rule as specied and estimated by Clarida Gali, and
Gertler for the Bundesbank is substantially higher than the increase we saw with the
policy rule used in the Baseline. This illustrates that, in terms of the unemployment
e¤ects which are the subject of this paper, we were quite conservative in specifying and
calibrating our Baseline policy rule. Apart from that, unemployment is persistently
higher under the Bundesbank rule than under the Federal Reserve one, though the
di¤erence is for the most part less than one percentage point. For instance after 10
years, unemployment and the NAIRU are about 0.5 percentage points higher under
the Bundesbank Rule than under the Federal Reserve rule.
It is, however, informative to take a look at the standard errors associated with
Clarida, Gali and Gertlers (CGGs) estimate. For instance, the standard error asso-
ciated with the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate  has as standard error of 0.03.
Thus a value for  of 0.06 is still consistent (at a 5% level of condence) with the CGG
estimate. The third row of table 9 shows the implied evolution of unemployment if
we set  = 0:91. The resulting unemployment trajectory is substantially lower than
before. After 40 quarters, the unemployment and the NAIRU are now 1.1 percentage
points lower than under the Bundesbank rule, while after 50 quarters, the di¤erence
is still 1 percentage point. In the same manner, we can also make use of the standard
error of the estimate of  Y , which equals 0.16. Increasing  Y to 0.88 yields the em-
ployment trajectory shown in the nal row of table 8, which is again lower than with
the point estimate. After 40 quarters, unemployment is and the NAIRU are about
1.1 percentage points lower than under the Bundesbank policy rule. Thus in the New
Growth model, di¤erences in policy function parameters consistent with the CGG
evidence can contribute to explaining the di¤erent evolutions of the unemployment
rate in Germany as compared to the United States.
Accordingly, di¤erences in monetary policy also explain di¤erences in the change
in the productivity growth rate between Germany and United States from the 1970s
to the 1980s. As noted above, average US productivity growth declined by only about
0.18% from the 1970s to the 1980s, whereas the decline in Germany was about 1.4%.
Table 9 displays the di¤erence between average annualised productivity growth during
the rst decade after the shock and the decade before the shock.25 Thus within the
New Growth model, di¤erences in monetary policy would account for between 0.24
and 0.6 percentage points of the di¤erence in productivity growth.
25As above we assume that during the decade before the shock hits, the average productivity
growth rate equalled its steady state.
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Table 8: Results for CGG Policy Rules
Unemployment Deviation from the Steady State, percentage Points
Quarter 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Bundesbank 3.8 3.8 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1
Federal Reserve 2.9 3.1 2.5 2 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.9
Federal Reserve,  = 0:91 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6
Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 2.4 2.5 2 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7
Table 9: Results for CGG Policy Rules
Change in ten Year Average
productivity Growth, percentage Points
Bundesbank -1.28%
Federal Reserve -1.04%
Federal Reserve,  = 0:91 -0.68%
Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 -0.88%
Finally, we explore the e¤ects of the observed cross continental di¤erences in the
nature of real wage rigidity. Estimating (44) on U.S. data conrms the nding of
other researchers that c = 0; while the U.S. estimate of b is not signicantly di¤erent
from the value we employed so far (0.08). Therefore, in our nal experiment aimed at
highlighting cross country dimensions, we set c = 0 in the Baseline calibration, leaving
everything else as in the Baseline. The resulting deviation of unemployment from its
steady state can be obtained from table 11. Clearly, the increase in unemployment
is persistently lower. After 40 quarters, unemployment is only 0.6 percentage points
higher than in the steady state, compared to 1.7 percentage points in the Baseline.
Average annualised productivity growth is only 0.36% lower than in the previous
decade as opposed to 0.96% in the baseline calibration.
Within our model, c=0 would arise if there is no direct e¤ect of productivity on
e¤ort and if benets are not linked productivity. We suggested above that these
results might be rooted in stronger unions and perhaps a stronger link between un-
employment benets and productivity in Europe. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) nd
that the impact of macroeconomic shocks on unemployment is a¤ected by the labour
market structure. They nd that both unobservable macroeconomic shocks (captured
by a time e¤ect) as well as a one percentage point reduction in total factor productiv-
ity growth increase unemployment by more the higher is union density. This result is
conrmed by Fitoussi et al. (2000). In that sense, our model provides some theoret-
ical to the notion that both "shocks and institutions" (Blanchard and Wolfers) are
crucial to explaining the cross country evidence on the evolution of unemployment.
Table 10: c = 0 - Percentage point Deviation of Unemployment from
its Steady State for selected Quarters
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.9 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
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7 Conclusion
This paper applies a New Keynesian with unemployment and endogenous growth
to explain the persistent increase in continental European unemployment and the
lack thereof in the United States. We calibrate key parameters like the coe¢ cients
in the wage setting equation and the interest feedback rule of the central bank to
Western German data. The model economy is hit with a one quarter cost-push shock
calibrated to induce a disination of an order of magnitude seen at the beginning of
the 1980s in many industrialised OECD economies. We perform the same experiment
on a model without endogenous growth: The JLN economy.
Under the baseline calibration, unemployment will still be about 1.8 percentage
points above its pre-shock value after about 10 years. As can be observed with con-
tinental European unemployment rates, unemployment increases quickly but reverts
only very slowly. At the same time, ination stops declining soon after the cost push
shock has vanished, implying that the NAIRU has increased. Unsurprisingly, no such
e¤ect is seen in the JLN economy, where unemployment is back to its steady state
after about two years.
The increase in the NAIRU in the New Growth economy is brought about by the
decline in investment during the recession required to disinate the economy. In the
New Growth economy, for a given employment level, capital stock growth determines
labour productivity growth. Hence the real wage-capital ratio is the main driver
of marginal costs. Thus, although wage growth declines as employment contracts,
marginal cost returns back to its steady state level soon after the shock has vanished
because capital stock growth for while declines even more. This stops the disination.
The subsequent recovery is very slow because the central bank has no reason to lower
interest rates. Its reaction function dictates that it reacts solely to ination, being
close to target, and the output gap, dened as the deviation of output from the level
consistent with constant ination, which is zero.
The model thus also contributes, to explaining the productivity slowdown ob-
served across advanced OECD economies, and why negative shocks to productivity
growth are frequently signicant variables in regression of unemployment on this
variable and others.
Finally, apart from generating a persistent increase in unemployment, the model
also contributes to explaining cross country di¤erences in unemployment. Varying the
size of the cost push shock generates a relationship between the change in the ination
rate and the change in the NAIRU over a ten year horizon similar to a relationship
in the data rst observed by Ball (1996). Using comparable policy rule estimates
of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) for the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserves
while holding the cost-push shock constant creates higher persistent unemployment
with the later than with the former. Finally, taking account of a well established
cross-continental di¤erence in the structure of the wage setting function, namely the
absence of a labour share term, also proves informative. In the absence of the labour
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share term, we see a lower increase in the NAIRU. The size of the labour share term
in wage setting can be linked, if coarsely so, to features of the labour market like
union density or the benet system. Thus the paper lends support to the view that,
as suggested by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), it is both "shocks and institutions"
which are at the heart of explaining the evolution of unemployment across time and
the di¤erences across countries.
8 Appendix A: Normalised Version of the New
Growth Model
As we are dealing with two growth models, we have to stationarise all variables which
would otherwise be trended in order to be able to solve the model. This appendix
applies this normalisation to the New Growth model. The resulting equations are
those which have been solved and simulated. We dene Ct
Kt
; habt 1
Kt
Yt+wtns
Kt
; It
Kt
and wt
Kt
as Dt; Habt 1; Ft; Rt and Ht; while the gross capital stock growth rate
Kt+1
Kt
  1 is
dened as gkt+1:
We directly apply the normalisation to the equations of the aggregate demand
block:
Ft = Dt +Rt +
'
2
(t   t 1)2 (Ft  Htns) +Htns (49)
Consumption (remember habt 1 = jCt 1; thus Habt 1 = j
Dt 1
1+gkt
1= (Dt  Habt 1) = Et
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(1 + it) =
 
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 
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
(50)
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1 + gkt+1
(51)
Investment:
Et
 
1
(Dt+1  Habt)
 
1 + gKt+1
  rkt+1 + qt+1 (1  )
!
=
1
Dt  Habt 1 qt(52)
1
Dt  Habt 1 qt
" 
1  
2

Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gkt
  (1 + g)2!  Rt
Rt 1


Rt
Rt 1
 
1 + gkt
  (1 + g)#(53)
+Et
"
1
Dt+1  Habt qt+1

Rt+1
Rt
 
1 + gkt+1
2


Rt+1
Rt
 
1 + gkt+1
  (1 + g)# = 1
Dt  Habt 1
From (39) we have
gkt+1 =   +Rt
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The rental on capital becomes:
rkt = mct (Ft  Htns) (55)
Substituting (55) into (17) and multiplying by K

1 
t
K

1 
t
yields
mct =
(Ft  Htns)

1  Ht
X
(56)
where X = A
1
1  (1  )1.
The wage setting funciton lnwt = lnwt 1+a+ b (nt   n)+ c log

wt 1(nt 1 n ns)
Yt 1

can be rewritten as (using equation (16)) lnHt = a+ b (nt   n) + ln

wt 1
Kt 1(1+gkt )

+
c log ((1  )mct 1) = a+ b (nt   n) + ln

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(1+gkt )

+ c log ((1  )mct 1)
Ht = exp(a+ b (nt   n)) Ht 1 
1 + gkt
 ((1  )mct 1)c (57)
Employment: from Outputt = AKt((nt   n  ns)1)1  + wtns; we have
Ft = A((nt   n  ns)1)1  +Htns (58)
The Phillips Curve and the Policy rule do not contain any trended variables and
therefore does not need to be normalised. However, we will substitute the real prots
stochastic discount factor by its denition, i.e. t;t+1 = 
u0(Ct+1 Habt)
u0(Habt 1)
=  Ct Habt 1
Ct+1 Habt ;
which gives
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Replacing Pt+i
Pt 1+i
= 1 + t+i gives
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For natural output, natural employment and the natural real wage from equation
 1 =
(F nt )

1  Hnt
X
(63)
F nt = At((n
n
t   n  ns)1)1  + nsHnt
Hnt = exp(a+ b (n
n
t   n))
Ht 1 
1 + gkt
 ((1  )mct 1)c (64)
given last periods wage/ capital ratio Ht 1 and this periods capital stock growth
rate gkt (which was also determined in the t-1 by the then investment decision). The
output gap gpt is then calculated as
gpt =
Outputt  Outputnt
Outputnt

Kt
Kt

=
Ft   F nt
F nt
(65)
9 Appendix B: Steady State Relations
This Appendix shows how to calculate the steady state values for the system devel-
oped in Appendix B. We will rst derive a steady state relation between the level of
employment and the steady state growth rate for the New Growth Economy.
First apply the fact that in the steady state, gKt = g to (53) which yields q = 1:
We then apply this to (52) which yields

 
rkt+1 + (1  )

= (1 + g) (66)
In the New Growth economy, we now replace the capital rental with equation (55)
and, after using (58) and noting that in the steady state we have mc =  1; arrive at
g =



(1  ) +  1A((n  n  ns)1)1 
  1 (67)
This is the steady state growth rate which is borne out by the marginal product
of capital in the endogenous growth economy. It is easily veried that it is increasing
and concave in employment. It is straightforward to show that in the steady state,
the real wage implied by the desired mark-up grows at the same rate as output and
the capital stock by using mct =  1 and rkt = r
k on (31). This yields
wt = Kt1

 1A(1  )1 
(rk)
1=(1 )
(68)
Hence in the steady state, the real wage has to grow at the same rate as the capital
stock. This means that equation (68) actually the dynamic, endogenous growth
version of the familiar macroeconomic textbook price setting function: It gives the
real wage growth rate compatible with marginal costs remaining constant and at its
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long run level. Unlike the textbook price setting function, this real wage growth rate
is not constant but increases in employment: A higher steady state employment level
implies a higher marginal product of capital, which triggers higher investment and
thus faster capital stock- and thus productivity growth. Accordingly, the steady state
levels of employment an the growth rate are determined by the intersection of (67)
with the wage setting function (20), (making again use of the fact that mc =  1 in
the steady state).
In practice, we choose a desired steady state employment rate (here 0.96) and
then compute the wage setting function intercept a to support this value, given g, b
and  and n:
Having determined g and n; the determination of the steady state values of
Ft; Dt; Rt; Ht; r
k
t and it is now straightforward. For F we have
F = A((n  n  ns)1)1  (69)
from the production function. ForRt; we have from the capital accumulation equation
in (54)
R = g +  (70)
D can then be determined as a residual via
D = F  R (71)
H is computed using the cost-minimisation rst order condition for labour (16)
H = (1  ) 1 F
n  n  ns (72)
rk is computed via
rk =  1A((n  n  ns)1)1  (73)
The steady state value of it is computed from (50)
i =
1 + g

  1 (74)
Note that this is also the intercept of the interest rate rule i of the central bank.
10 Appendix C: Normalised Version of the JLN
Economy
Most of the equations from Appendix B just carry over to the JLN economy. However,
there are a few changes related to the production function and the marginal cost equa-
tion. The aggregate production function is nowOutputt = AKt (TFPt1 (nt   n  ns))1 +
wtn
s: Dividing both sides by Kt gives
Ft = (lt1 (nt   n  ns))1  +Htns (75)
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where lt is dened as TFPtKt . This variable evolves according to
lt =
1 + gTFP
1 + gKt
lt 1 (76)
In the JLN model, it convenient to normalise the real wage with respect to TFPt
rather than with respect to Kt, while all the remaining normalisations carry over to
the JLN model. Denoting wt
TFPt
as Hnct ; we have from (42) ; after making use of (40)
mct =
F
(=(1 ))
t H
nc
t
A1=(1 ) (1  )1
(77)
Concerning the capital rental, we employ the JLN expression for Ft to have
rkt = mctAl
1 
t ((nt   n  ns)1)1  (78)
The normalised wage setting equation becomes
Hnct = exp(a+ b (nt   n))
Hnct 1
(1 + gTFP )
((1  )mct 1)c (79)
All the remaining equations are just the same as in the New Growth version. The
computation of the steady state values in the neoclassical model is slightly di¤erent.
The steady state growth rate (of output, consumption, the capital stock, the real
wage) is now given by the parameter gTFP rather than being endogenously deter-
mined, which means we have g = gTFP : Hence we can compute the steady state real
interest rate from 74, while we compute rk from (66). From (79), we have the steady
state employment rate. Setting mct =  1in (78) then gives the steady state value
for lt as
l =
1
(nt   n  ns)1

rk
A
1=(1 )
(80)
which allows us to compute F from (75). Rearranging (77) then yields Hnc:
11 Appendix E: Estimation of the Wage Setting
Function
We estimate the real wage growth function using German data ranging from 1970Q1
to 2000Q4. Our dataset includes Western German data up to 1991Q4 and fol-
lowing that data for the unied country. All data is taken from a publication
of the German "Statistisches Bundesamt", all of which has been seasonally ad-
justed.26 When estimating the function, we replace the employment rate with one
26See Statistisches Bundesamt (2006) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2007a).
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minus the unemployment rate. As a measure for labour costs, we use the "Arbeit-
nehmerentgeld" per hour worked, which is employee compensation including the
full tax wedge. This is deated using the GDP price index. The labour share is
given by total nominal compensation (i.e. total "Arbeitnehmerentgeld") divided
by total nominal GDP. Denoting the unemploymentrate as U, we then estimate
 logwt = a + b  Ut + c log (LSt 1) + d92Q1; where LSt 1 denotes the previous
periods labour share in GDP, d92Q1 denotes an intercept dummy equalling one in
1992Q1 and zero everywhere else. The later is to account for reunication. We use
two stage least squares to account for the possible endogeneity of employment. As
instruments, we choose log realwaget 1; unemploymentratet 1 (following Danthine
and Kurman (2004)); c and d92Q1:27
Note that we use Newey-West Standard Errors serial correlation consistent stan-
dard errors because the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation rejects the
hypotheses of no serial correlation at the 5% level. The result is reported in table E1,
where WG denotes the change in log real wages and U denotes the unemployment
rate.
27See Danthine/ Kurman (2004), p. 121.
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Table E1
Dependent Variable: WG
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Date: 06/03/08 Time: 12:27
Sample (adjusted): 1970Q3 2000Q4
Included observations: 122 after adjustments
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)
Instrument list: WG(-1) C U(-1) LOG(LS(-2)) D92Q1
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.042273 0.018893 -2.237531 0.0271
U -0.120587 0.046582 -2.588689 0.0108
LOG(LS(-1)) -0.089599 0.032530 -2.754342 0.0068
D92Q1 -0.112300 0.002188 -51.33630 0.0000
R-squared 0.574362 Mean dependent var 0.005890
Adjusted R-squared 0.563541 S.D. dependent var 0.014077
S.E. of regression 0.009300 Sum squared resid 0.010205
F-statistic 52.46032 Durbin-Watson stat 2.535359
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note that our calibrated value of b is lower than the point estimate of 0.12. How-
ever, it is not statistically di¤erent from 0.12 with any reasonable level of condence,
in fact it is less than one standard deviation away from the point estimate. The rea-
son for this choice is that while it is possible to preserve the results of this paper in
face of higher wage exibility, this calibration has certain undesirable features. If we
aim to achieve a steady growth rate of GDP in the order of magnitude of a reasonable
order of magnitude (and one that makes lifetime utility converge), we would have to
choose either relatively high depreciation rates or a lower individual discount factor
, the later implying a very high steady state risk less rate. We think that these
considerations justify the choice of a value smaller than the point estimate.
The reason why the coe¢ cient of the labour share c also falls short of the calibrated
coe¢ cient, though the distance is again less than one standard deviation. This is due
to the fact that we have experimented with di¤erent computations of the labour
share in GDP. The alternative computation was based on real values of GDP and
employee compensation. The later computations methods generated a value of -0.12
than the -0.1 we use in the simulations. It is not a priori clear which measure is more
appropriate. In fact to is common to interpret the labour share term as real wages
divided by productivity (i.e. real GDP/hour or real GDP/ employee) and enter these
variables separately.28 Furthermore, a reduction of c by 0.01 has only small e¤ects on
28Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p. 486 and OECD (1997), p. 21.
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our simulation results.
For the United States, we estimate the wage setting equation using the BLS series
on real hourly compensation, BLS series PRS85006153, to calculate  logwt; the
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, series LNS14000000Q, nominal GDP from
the BEA NIPA table 1.1.5 and total nominal employee compensation from the BEA
NIPA table 2.1. In order to get a signicant coe¢ cient on the unemployment rate, we
were forced to include ve years more than in our estimate for Germany. The result
can be obtained from Table E2. As expected, the LS is not signicant. Re estimating
the equation after dropping log (LSt 1) leads to an almost unchanged estimate of the
coe¢ cient on the unemployment rate. Note that the coe¢ cient on the unemployment
rate in Germany is not statistically di¤erent from the coe¢ cient estimated for the
U.S. at any reasonable level of condence.
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Table E2
Dependent Variable: WG
Method: Least Squares
Date: 06/03/08 Time: 16:03
Sample: 1965Q1 2000Q4
Included observations: 144
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.005364 0.033562 0.159838 0.8732
U -0.066995 0.033021 -2.028888 0.0444
LS 0.003206 0.059322 0.054043 0.9570
R-squared 0.030102 Mean dependent var 0.003202
Adjusted R-squared 0.016345 S.D. dependent var 0.006138
S.E. of regression 0.006088 Akaike info criterion -7.344412
Sum squared resid 0.005226 Schwarz criterion -7.282541
Log likelihood 531.7977 F-statistic 2.188064
Durbin-Watson stat 1.642216 Prob(F-statistic) 0.115927
Table 3
Dependent Variable: WG
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Date: 06/03/08 Time: 13:15
Sample: 1965Q1 2000Q4
Included observations: 144
Instrument list: WG(-1) C U(-1)
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
U -0.067605 0.032425 -2.084951 0.0389
C 0.007253 0.002008 3.612856 0.0004
R-squared 0.030069 Mean dependent var 0.003202
Adjusted R-squared 0.023238 S.D. dependent var 0.006138
S.E. of regression 0.006067 Sum squared resid 0.005226
F-statistic 4.347020 Durbin-Watson stat 1.643279
Prob(F-statistic) 0.038864
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12 Appendix F: Construction of the Dataset used
in the Moment Comparison
This appendix explains the construction of the dataset for Ft; Dt; Rt and Ht. The
German federal statistical o¢ ce ("Statistisches Bundesamt") supplies annual data
for the capital stock in constant prices of the year 2000.29 Thus we had to construct
quarterly observations for the capital stock. We decided on the following method.
We rst calculated the annual change. Than we allocated the total changed to the
four quarters according to the share these quarters had in real gross xed investment.
This gave as a beginning of quarter value for the capital stock.
Our data on real output, consumption and investment expenditure was preferably
also to be in prices of 2000. However, the Statistisches Bundesamt only supplies
chained indices for these variables.30 We therefore used nominal GDP, consumption
and investment 2000 to recursively calculate our series in absolute numbers. As the
indices for post and pre reunication years have di¤erent bases, we used the ratio
of unied Germany to Western Germany from 1991 to downscale the index for each
variable.
Furthermore, as the total labour force in our model is normalised to one, Output,
consumption and investment are essentially expressed in per capita terms in our
model, as is the capital stock. Hence case of Ft; Dt and Rt; the number of inhabitants
cancels out and we can divide real GDP by our capital stock measure, and accordingly
for Dt and Rt. By contrast, Ht is computed by multiplying the real wage as measured
in the previous section times the average number of hours worked across the sample.
We tried a linear trend for hours worked instead but this would have turned our
measure of Ht non-stationary.
The null of stationarity is rejected at the 5% level for Dt and Ft using the KPSS
test. After removing the years 70 to 73, we are not rejecting the null of stationarity
anymore at the 10% level for these variables. For Ht, the null of stationarity is not
rejected at the 5% level for the full sample:For Rt; the unit root can be rejected over
the entire sample at the 5% level using an ADF test, as is the case for gt and the
savings rate. The same holds for the nominal interest rate, and so we do not detrend
this variable either. We do detrend the ination rate, because the null of stationarity
is rejected for this variable using a KPSS test.
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